

HISTORICAL
ANECDOTES
RELATIVE TO THE
AMERICAN REBELLION.

[Price Eighteen-Pence.]

~~First Meeting~~
~~of the~~
~~Committee~~

~~for the~~
~~purpose of~~
~~organizing~~

~~a~~
~~committee~~
~~to~~

~~investigate~~
~~the~~
~~condition~~

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~~commonwealths~~

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~~the~~
~~principalities~~

9/13/2

HISTORICAL
ANECDOTES,
CIVIL and MILITARY:
IN A
SERIES OF LETTERS,
WRITTEN
From AMERICA, in the years 1777 and 1778,
to different Persons in ENGLAND;
CONTAINING
OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
General MANAGEMENT of the WAR,
AND ON THE
CONDUCT of our Principal COMMANDERS,
IN THE
REVOLTED COLONIES,
During that PERIOD.

L O N D O N:
Printed for J. BEW, in PATERNOSTER-ROW.

M. DCC. LXXIX.

5



ADVERTISEMENT.

OF the following Letters only a few were at first in the possession of the Publisher; but they contained, in his apprehension, information too important to be suppressed. He therefore submitted them to the inspection of some friends; intimating at the same time an intention of sending them to the press. Those, again, happening to show them to others; the consequence was, not only an Approbation of his design, both as laudable, and even as a Duty; but also a Communication of many more Letters, equally interesting, written by some of the most respectable and intelligent Loyalists in America. The whole would have formed a pretty large Volume. But as the collection entire, containing many letters written by different persons upon the *same* events, would necessarily have exhibited a number of Repetitions, it appeared more eligible to publish only a Selection. And such is the Series now presented to the Public: Concerning which, it may not be improper to add, that several of the Letters of which it consists had been long ago transcribed, with a view to publication, by a Gentleman to whom many of them were originally addressed: but He having afterwards altered his intention, they would probably have never seen the light, had not copies of them happened to fall into other hands; and copies were often *solicited*, by such particularly as were more immediately concerned in the issue of the present unnatural REBELLION.

E R R A T A.

Page 65. line 23. for *actions* read *orations*.

73. 10. for *In* read *It*.

HISTORICAL ANECDOTES, &c. &c.

RELATIVE TO THE

AMERICAN REBELLION.

NEW-YORK, Feb. 9. 1777.

I TOLD you in my last, that the Rebels were numerous in and about the county of *West-Chester*. Upon the appearance of some ships in the *Sound* from *Rhode-Island*, with troops on board, they ran off helter-skelter, in the midst of a violent snow-storm. However, as those troops did not land, They are returned. The sole design of these vermin is, I believe, to distress the loyal inhabitants; and as no protection is afforded them, they have it in their power to be as mischievous as they please. Miserable people! They were first plundered of the greatest part of their cattle, horses, and sheep, by the *rebels*: They were then fallen upon by the *Hessians*, who swept away cows, hogs, sheep, geese, ducks, &c. at a stroke; burnt their fences, and obliged them to part with their hay and corn, at about half price, for Forage. Now the rebels are come again, and are taking away whatever they can lay their hands upon.---

A

Learn

Learn from one instance, how the Loyalists are there treated. When the king's troops were in that part of the country, your old acquaintance Mr ——— was very active in giving them every assistance in his power. The rebels had information of his conduct. They had before taken his fat cattle, &c. to the number of about *forty*; and when the royal army retired, attempted to take him prisoner; but he escaped them, by half an hour, and got hither. They then stripped his house of every thing worth carrying away, except the provisions laid up for the winter; "because he was a d---d *tory*, and had gone to the king's troops for protection." The next day came the light dragoons, provided with bags, and carried off all the beef, pork, and gammons; "because he was a d---d rebel, and had run away for fear of the king's army." The poor gentleman is now in the town with his family, with little, next to nothing, to subsist on. He cannot return; and if he could, he could not live, unless he could eat stones: for, by all accounts, there are not provisions enough left, between the *White-Plains* and *King's-Bridge*, to keep the inhabitants alive for two months longer. But, after the facts that have been stated, you will be as good a judge of the matter as I am myself: nay, a much better; as I am confident you are much better acquainted with that part of the country.

I would not, however, thus complain; nobody would complain at all; were it not apparent, that every mild, coaxing method is used
towards

towards the rebels, and no care taken to protect the loyalists; were it not evident, that several palpable opportunities of decisively ruining the rebel army, have been either ignorantly lost, or wilfully neglected.

I informed you of the disaster which happened to the *Hessians* at *Trenton*. Some say they had been keeping Christmas a little too merrily; others, that instead of briskly turning out on the alarm, they staid to secure the plunder they had amassed: neither of which accounts is improbable.


After WASHINGTON had sent off his prisoners, he continued in and about *Trenton*. Lord CORNWALLIS, with the true spirit of an *Englishman*, marched to attack him; leaving three regiments, as a guard to the baggage, at *Prince-Town*. He arrived at *Trenton* towards night. WASHINGTON retired, and took possession of the ground between the *town* and the *ferry*. Some, it is said, were for attacking him immediately: but, upon the whole, it was judged most adviseable to wait for the morning. About ten o'clock, WASHINGTON left his fires burning, fell back into what is called the *Quaker-Road*, made a forced march to *Prince-Town*, and attacked the three regiments. A very brisk engagement ensued. The rebels suffered much, by the amazing vigour and resolution of the 17th regiment, commanded by the gallant Colonel MAWHOOD; who cut their way through many thousands of the rebels, seized three pieces of their cannon, and, turning them

upon the enemy, fired all the ammunition that was with them, and then retreated unpursued. WASHINGTON afterwards declared, "that the British soldiers, on this occasion, did not fight like men, but like devils." However, by this march he saved himself from utter destruction, and got to *Morris-Town*.—Had there been less plundering, there would have been better intelligence. *Alieni appetens, sui profusus*, is a character by no means *appropriated* to the great ROMAN patriot.

After all, say I, the d---l take rebellion: it is his own child; and if he has the least property of a *gentleman*, he won't think much of taking the brat home, and providing for it in his own territories.

Well, my good friend, God bless you and yours! It is now near one o'clock, Feb. 10. 1777. My fire is out, and wood very scarce. It has been 5*l.* the chord. *Beef* is from 12 to 18 pence, the pound; *mutton* the same; *veal* from 18 to 24 pence; a couple of *fowls*, 10 shillings; trade entirely ruined, and my purse almost empty: And so, "God save great George our King."

Your's, most unquestionably.



NEW-YORK, Feb. 16. 1777.

BEING seated pretty comfortably, as times now go, at my own coal-fire, with my boys chatting around me; I take now and then an interval

terval in their discourse, to turn my thoughts towards *you* and *England*. You will naturally ask me, What those thoughts are? and I will as readily tell you,—None of the most pleasing. For these two months, or nearly, have we been boxed about in *Jersey*, as if we had no *feelings*. Our cantonments have been beaten up; our foraging parties attacked, sometimes defeated, and the forage carried off from us; all travelling between the posts hazardous; and, in short, the troops harassed beyond measure by continual duty: yet the friends to government have been worse used by these troops than by the rebels. Plundering, and destroying property, without distinction, have been practised; inso-much that many people have joined WASHINGTON, because they found most protection from him, though otherwise well affected to the King. How this will end, it is difficult to foresee: but that your friends are the chief sufferers in the first instance, is undoubted; and that they are likely to be so in the long run, seems by much too probable. I wish my station permitted me to leave the country: I am heartily tired of my present residence. We have such an heterogeneous mixture, in this place, of sufferers by the rebels, sufferers by the king's troops; snakes in our bosoms, from the few who have benefited by the late *proclamations*, and who are *reconciled* to government from interest or treacherous motives, and not from penitence or principle; that I call those the happiest, who are the farthest from us. And such are the oversights,

fights, delays, &c. that the most speculative cannot account for them, on the footing of even common understanding. Yet we out-number the rebels greatly; nay, they have never been at all equal to us since the striking of the very first blow upon *Long-Island*: and I begin to fear now, that, by temporizing, we shall teach them to fight, and perhaps to beat us: We shall certainly teach them to harass us, and weary us out, by expence of men and money, which is their chief dependance. Several deserters have lately gone over to the rebels, in consequence of the late inactivity of the troops, and of their continual alarms.

I wish I could flatter myself, that a new system would take place in our military operations. Want of intelligence is, I fear, not the least of our reproaches. The Hessian soldiers, ignorant of our language, prepossessed against the whole country, and ever greedy of plunder, have deterred the inhabitants from coming near their quarters: and I believe the trade of *spies* is not well understood by us, though practised with great success by the *rebels*. All the expence of *cash* and *Christians* on account of *Canada*, is justly to be ascribed to our Northern Commander; as, by doing his duty like an honest and intelligent officer, it might have been prevented. To make up his lee-way, a respectable army must be employed two campaigns; when, even after one, he might have finished the whole; at least another officer might have done it. I send you the copy of a letter from

a field-officer, respecting his last feats. His refusing the assistance of 1700 Indians; his neglect of *St John's*; his inattention to embody the *Canadian militia*, till the army was in the country; his dismissing all the prisoners on parole; his recalling Indian parties, when going out voluntarily for intelligence; and sundry other instances of singularity of conduct; are, I think, as descriptive of his character, as his fall from *Quebec*, or his victory on *Lake Champlain*.

We are told that general HOWE is to go to the *Ferseys* to-morrow: but what is to be done, remains a profound secret; and I think it right, that all future intended operations should be secret: but why the *events* of war should be concealed, I cannot guess; unless for fear of discouraging the troops. Yet all events in *Fersey* have been as impenetrable secrets to us, as if the fate of Empires depended on their publication. We have been obliged to wait, with what patience we could, for the least intelligence; till some private correspondent, or a *Philadelphia paper*, conveyed to us the little insignificant bickerings in that part of the country. Yet, with all this grumbling, I have no doubt of our succeeding at last, if our rulers please to use the means. Our good King is curiously served here, in many instances: and more departments than one have their *Fabius's*, and perhaps their *Catilines* too. I think the jaundice of the *opposition* at home may be plainly perceived in the countenances of some of their
abettors

abettors abroad : and though men of honour will always guard against every Impeachment of their honour ; yet I think the work goes on the most cleverly, when honour and conviction go hand in hand.—I have often said, That the people of this country never, from the beginning of the dispute, meant to be *convinced* ; and I am confident they are not, by any benefits or indulgences, to be rendered *grateful*. When I say *people*, you know whom I intend. It is high time to try other methods, if you mean to keep *America* in *subordination* : and if not, even give us up with a good grace ; and then we shall know our fate, without remaining longer in suspense. But remember, *Britain*, That the *olive-branch* never pleases so much, as when held out after suffering much and dreading more from the hand which holds it. *Grata superveniet, quæ non sperabitur, hora*. May I therefore take you sooner by the hand, than it is probable I shall do by present appearances!

Farewell! &c. &c.



NEW-YORK, March 24. 1777.

IT would give me the highest satisfaction, could I send you such accounts from hence as you would wish to receive. The conclusion of the campaign you will have seen in the public papers before this reaches you. It ended in cantoning the troops from *Hackinsack* to *Burlington* in *New Jersey*. WASHINGTON had not
above

above 4000 miserable worn-out troops with him; and they were not more fatigued than dispirited. He posted them on the *Pennsylvania* side of the *Delaware*, and it was with difficulty he kept them together. But the tables were soon turned upon us: for with this handful of men he attacked the *Hessians* at *Trenton*, and took most of the brigade prisoners. This disaster occasioned us shortly to abandon all our extent of posts, and only to occupy *Amboy* and *Brunswick*, and some small places in their environs. The rebel forces have not, by the best accounts, exceeded 6000 men since that time. Yet with these WASHINGTON has been very active all the winter, and not a little troublesome to our quarters, notwithstanding it is said his troops have been very sickly.

It would be endless to give you an account of the alarms and attacks of our foraging parties, &c.: and were I to attempt it, I should probably misrepresent them; as I could only tell you what our newspapers have announced, and the reports of common fame; to neither of which much credit is to be given. Suffice it therefore to observe upon the whole, that our army in the *Jerseys* has been much harassed; and that the spirits of the insurgents appear yet so high, as not to promise any speedy overtures for a reconciliation. There must be another campaign, before even this part of the country will be reduced: I wish there may be only one: but I fear the rebels will protract the war by avoiding any decisive action. This they have hi-

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therto had the address to accomplish, and to extricate themselves most astonishingly; when, with less wisdom or good fortune on their part, (call it by what name you please), or with more conduct and activity on our's, they must have been inevitably ruined. Their troops have never yet been able to withstand our attacks; I believe they will not soon be brought to it; and it is amazing that, with such forces, they have been able to spin out even the last campaign. It can be owing to nothing but good generalship on one side, or bad management on the other; for rebel *bravery* is not yet become *honourably* notorious: and it is the opinion of many, that WASHINGTON's *impregnable* camp at *Morris-Town* might have been stormed, and his forces reduced to a cypher, with much less loss to the royal army than it sustained by the various skirmishes in the course of last winter. The escape of the rebels from *Long Island*, almost without loss, in the face of our conquering legions so *near* their lines, appears to me as extraordinary as any thing of the kind that ever happened. Nor do they want credit in their escape at the *White Plains*, and in their flight through *New Jersey*. They left *Newark* the very morning our troops entered that place; and yet made their way good through the whole province, into *Pennsylvania*. This management makes me fear, that they will be able to protract the war, unless they shall be pursued more than they have been; and if they do protract it, this country will be absolutely ruined, and
made

made a desert.—I could wish to draw a veil over the devastations that have been committed, for the honour of all concerned: but they cannot be concealed; and I pray GOD that such conduct may not bring on further evils to the King's affairs, than it has yet occasioned! Had rapine and plunder been restrained, I believe, and am far from being singular in my opinion, that the rebellion in this part of the continent had ended with the last campaign. Friends and foes have been treated with equal severity. As for myself, I shall have the world to begin again, at the discouraging age of 55, and without possessing those necessary arts by which so many princely fortunes have been *happily* acquired.—I sincerely thank you for your good wishes: but though I am sensible that his Majesty's humanity of heart would ever induce him to reward the fidelity of his subjects in an hour of trial like this; yet I am equally sensible that *all* cannot be rewarded, nor even compensated for their *losses* and *sufferings*. I hope, however, that *many* will experience, in proper time and season, not only the benevolence but beneficence of our most gracious and most beloved Sovereign.—Whom GOD long preserve! So daily prays,

Dear Sir,

Your's, most affectionately ever, &c.

NEW-YORK, July 15, 1777.

—THE war goes on slowly;—owing, I presume, to unavoidable causes. The King has here as gallant an army as ever took the field, and such as the Rebels dare not look in the face. The army from *Canada* is hastening towards us; having taken *Ticonderoga*, as we have just now heard. The Rebels are divided, distressed, and cut off from former resources; so that I think their cause is utterly desperate: and if we do but take the field in *time*, and push on our operations with vigour, the conclusion of this year will probably see an end of the rebellion, and the beginning of the next afford me an opportunity of shaking hands with you in perfect peace and security.

Your's, &c. &c.



NEW-YORK, July 24. 1777.

HAVING written to you copiously but a little while ago, and acquainted you with such matters here as I thought you would be desirous of knowing, I need not now repeat them. General BURGOYNE has crossed the Lakes;—and, on his approach to *Ticonderoga*, which was amazingly strong, the Rebels abandoned it precipitately, leaving every thing, except their muskets, behind them. He is hastening rapidly to *Albany*; and we soon expect great and goods news from that quarter.

General

General HOWE has embarked his army, and sailed the beginning of this week on an expedition—the place of his destination unknown to us ; but it is generally supposed he is gone to *Philadelphia* ; though it is universally wished that he may cast up in *New-England*.—WASHINGTON, with his utmost efforts, aided by the *puissant Congress*, for these six months past, has been able to collect an army of no more than thirteen or fourteen thousand at the extent : and with these he is now stationed on the west side of *Hudson's River*, close to the *Highlands* ; and, it is supposed, intends moving towards General HOWE, wherever he lands. I hope he will face him in the field. Indeed, if he does not, I cannot see why our Commander should hesitate a moment to *seek Him out* ; for we are all persuaded that we have the *power* of crushing this rebellion whenever we think proper. It is much to be regretted that the troops did not storm the rebel camp at *Bound-Brook*. To be sure the enterprize would have cost some lives ; but perhaps not more than may be lost by being crowded in ships during this extremity of heat, with the opposition they must expect to meet with, whatever place they shall land at, before they can accomplish any material service. This seems, however, pretty clear, either that the army should not have been carried to view the encampment, or else that they should have been *let loose* against it : they only wanted to have *liberty* given them ;—
and

and the rebellion, in most peoples' opinion, would have been no more.

I have said it is the general belief that our Commander is gone to *Philadelphia*, though several think otherwise; and they argue thus: "Why should he be at the trouble of putting his soldiers on shipboard, and sailing some *hundreds* of miles, when the road from *Brunswick* thither was plain and open before him, and the distance only *sixty*? *WASHINGTON's camp*, they observe, was far enough out of the way. If he quitted this strong hold, and came *after* the British troops, then he was only upon a par with them, in respect to situation; unless he could have carried his *mountains* along with him: And if he did not venture out, he could not possibly attack us; and we might have taken possession of *Philadelphia* in three or four *days*, which will now probably, if the forces are really gone thither, cost as many *weeks*. As for passing the *Delaware* above *Philadelphia*, it is a mere trifle indeed, (they say); and much more easily accomplished than sailing up that river from the Capes is likely to be, when the rebels have been so long and so assiduously employed in filling the channel with numberless obstructions."—To be sure there *appears* some degree of strength in this mode of reasoning; but I am still in good hopes that all our operations will at length evidence the wisdom and prudence of those who advised them. In a few weeks you shall hear the issue. Till then, with my kindest regards to Mrs —, I remain, dear Sir,
both

both your and her truly affectionate friend and servant.



NEW-YORK, July 26. 1777.

WHERE this letter will find you, or whether it will find you at all, I am not conjurer enough to prognosticate: but wherever it *may* find you, I hope it will find you happy. I long to hear from you; I long to see you: I sometimes wish to see you *here*: I oftener rejoice that you are so far removed from such scenes of vexation and chagrin, as those of which *we* are perpetual spectators: nor is *seeing* the worst of our sufferings. Who could have thought that this abominable rebellion would have been permitted to rise to so great, so enormous a height, or to have continued so long? Its whole strength ever has been, and in my opinion is now, mere weakness. Vigour and propriety of conduct would have crushed it last autumn, last spring, last any-time; and would yet crush it before Christmas.—General BURGOYNE is supposed to be near *Albany*. The rebels left *Ticonderoga* in the greatest hurry, and saved none of their stores or ammunition; and, by their own account, lost four or five hundred men in their flight. The *Albanians* are in great confusion, running into *New-England* for protection; from whence all the *militia* are gone to oppose the northern army. WASHINGTON is said to be at *Smith's Clove*, the entrance of the *Highlands*,
on

on the west side of *Hudson's river*, with about *eight thousand* men. Others are confident that he has crossed the river, and is at *Peek's Kill*, meditating an attack upon *King's-bridge*: but as General CLINTON is there, with six or eight thousand men, we have nothing to fear from that quarter.

Lord and General HOWE, with the grand army, sailed two days ago only from the *Hook*;—their destination unknown. I hope it is with a design of throwing the weight of the war into the *New-England* colonies. They are said to have *sixteen* thousand troops with them: therefore, if *that* is their direction, as may reasonably be presumed,—for they needed not to have gone by *water* to the *southward*,—they will make an easy conquest of the *coasts* at least of those provinces, while the Rebel Militia, their only present strength, is towards *Albany*; and as for their *back* settlements, exclusively of the Northern Army's being ready to *take care* of them, they can receive no sort of *supplies*, and consequently can be of no service to their *common cause*, as they call their rebellion, when intercepted from the *ocean*.

BURGOYNE's army is supposed to consist of twelve or thirteen thousand, *Canadians* and *Indians* included: and a large body of the latter, together with some *regulars*, are daily expected down the *Mohawck's-river*. Should this force be vigorously exerted in the *New-England* colonies, they must inevitably submit this *summer*; and the *autumn* would be a good season
for

for a southern campaign; on which service I hope to be an attendant.

We have been anxious for the opening of the *North River*, that a communication with General BURGOYNE might have been practicable. However, we are glad, at any rate, that the armies are in motion: and we hope to be able, by the next conveyance, to send some accounts of real consequence over the *Atlantic*.

With due respects to your good family,
and proper regards to all friends,

I am, Dear Sir, your's, &c. &c.

P. S. Deserters just now come in, say, that the rebels are defeated at *Still-Water*, about 28 miles above *Albany*: that the slaughter was considerable on both sides; but that the rout was effectual, and that many had submitted. The account is generally credited; but I am not without diffidence: therefore lay no great stress upon *this* information; for as I do not want to be deceived myself, so neither do I wish to deceive others.

NEW-YORK, August 20. 1777.

THOUGH it be a very long time since I had the pleasure of a line from you, yet you are never a day from my thoughts; and I am in earnest expectation of the next arrival from *England*,—hoping thereby to receive favourable accounts of at least the personal welfare of yourself and your family.

C

We

We are yet, in this country, in a strange state of uncertainty and suspense, concerning the operations and probable issue of the present campaign; and I have no intelligence to give you, but vague report and uncertain conjecture.—It is now more than four weeks since Lord and Sir WILLIAM HOWE sailed with the grand fleet of near 300 ships, carrying with them sixteen thousand men, at least, as we generally imagine. They entered *Delaware Bay*; and alarming the country, drew Mr WASHINGTON from the *Highlands*, on the *North River*, to *Philadelphia*. But the fleet attempted nothing in the *Delaware*; and I know not that we have had any certain accounts of it, since it left that bay. It has, however, been several times reported, that the troops were landed near *Elk River* at the head of *Chesapeak bay*. This report gained great credit three days ago, but is now again dying away.

The rebels in and about *Philadelphia* are seemingly in high spirits on the occasion; and, attempting to be witty, have *advertised* Sir WILLIAM as an absconder from his master's service. Great liberties are also taken here—I do not mean by the rebellious or suspected people. One said on the coffee-house bridge last night, That the army was gone to *Bermuda*, as a place of greater safety than any on the Continent: Another was certain that they had sailed for *New Providence*, to eat *Turtle* in perfection; upon a supposition that those which are brought hither from thence, are emaciated
and

and lose their flavour in the passage. Many, however, are confident, that some great and capital stroke will, by and by, be executed by Sir WILLIAM. I wish it may be a *decisive* one. But my fears are, that just enough will be done to keep *him* in command, and *us* in wretchedness, another campaign.

General BURGOYNE is supposed, and I think with great probability, to be at or near *Albany*. His success, as far as we can judge here, has hitherto been as great as he could expect. It is also believed, that *Fort-Stanwix*, at the head of the *Mohawks River*, is reduced. If so, he must have that whole back country at his command.

General Sir H. CLINTON lies at King's-Bridge with six or seven thousand *British*, *Hessians*, *Anspachers*, and *Americans*: but we are in expectation of his doing some business or other in a short time; for he does not love to be idle.

We have had most violently hot weather for some time past, and most immoderate rains. As soon as the coolness of *Autumn* comes on, the campaign will probably open—if it opens at all.

I still am of opinion, that nothing but *vigour* is wanting to crush the military force of *America* in a very short time. WASHINGTON's army is the life and soul of the rebellion. Were that completely routed, a very moderate share of address would place every thing on a proper footing. But while that subsists, whatever else

may be done, will be ineffectual; because rebellion will still have something to look to for support. But I know not what great matters can be expected from persons who seem to have no idea of seizing the passing opportunity. WASHINGTON has been more than once in their power, and suffered to escape. Rebellion has been gasping at their feet; and, thro' mismanagement on our part, has revived, and gained additional strength.—Loyalty is languishing, and I fear declining, under oppression: Rebellion is domineering and triumphing, notwithstanding the amazing exertion of the Nation, in men and money, for the protection of the one, and the extirpation of the other.—I repeat what I said in a former letter:—The strength of this rebellion, even now, is mere weakness, compared with the British army in this country. It has been suffered to acquire its present consequence, through inattention, mismanagement, blundering, and ———; and nothing is wanting but vigour and propriety of conduct, to crush it to atoms.

When, my good Sir, shall we have another social meeting, to laugh at the cares and follies of the world?—I have written several letters to you, which I can only *hope* you have received. This I shall inclose to Lord ———, and wish you would shew it him; indeed, I have desired his Lordship to open it, in case you have left *England* before it arrives.

Believe me to be, sincerely, and ever,
Your's, &c. &c.

THE

NEW-YORK, August 21. 1777.

THE season is sufficiently advanced, one would think, to have something to communicate concerning our military operations: but nothing has been effected yet that we know of. The fleet has disappeared from our coasts these four weeks, with a very respectable body of troops on board, supposed to be fourteen or sixteen thousand men; and we do not certainly know, at this very hour, whither they are gone, or what they have been doing. Never was there such trifling with such a set of miscreants. We have made them of consequence ourselves, even in the eyes of Europe, by our attention and respectful treatment of the most contemptible set of wretches that ever disgraced a country. And after having made *gentlemen* of them, we are now labouring hard to make them *soldiers*. Indeed our Chiefs seem so lukewarm, so piteous, so forgiving, that we are at present a more motley crew in this city, than ever you knew us, bad as we were before: And in case of an Attack, I should apprehend more danger from *within* than from *without*. *Tories* in your time were not allowed to possess a *pistol*: but we can allow *the poor rebel prisoners* on *Long Island*, not only to ramble about on their parole of *honour*, but even indulge them with what fire-arms they chuse, for their *innocent amusement*. Matters go on with JOHN BULL so heavily, so slovenly, that many *prudent* folks, uncertain which side may yet prevail, are very
fond

fond of preaching lenity and forgiveness, that they may be sure of having friends in both parties. This makes the rebels say, That they may continue their frolic as long as they please, knowing they shall be well received at last. And they speak the truth too: for what risk do they run, if they can but escape a bullet or a bag-onet? And as it is not their *business* to *fight*,—a circumstance which they are full well aware of,—there is but little danger of their falling in Battle. What is *our* business I shall not take upon me to point out,—lest I should offend the great ones; who, neither here nor in *Canada*, seem to have thought of it as I have done. Many are the sins of omission, and not one of commission has yet reached me—except plundering. Never have I heard such complaints in every department, as are heard in this army. It seems to me, that the ruling powers in the mother-country are infatuated, by trusting their affairs to the hands of those who were never well affected to them. As to the Northern Chief, he is avowedly an *American*, as I have been repeatedly assured by many that were formerly well acquainted with his political sentiments: And every instance of his conduct shews it,—except his battle in *Lake Champlain*; which may be considered as a sop to stop mouths. The last instance of his address, as a military man, is curious. While danger threatened *Canada*, he *felt bold*; he wanted no troops to maintain authority: Now there is no danger, he thinks it *necessary* for the safety of his province, to weaken

ken BURGOYNE's army, by detaining 3,000 regulars in *Canada*; and, with them, two of the most active and gallant officers in it, viz. General M^cLEAN, and Colonel FOY, now Adjutant General in that district. Such are the subjects employed to reduce Rebels! I shall never think you seriously resolved to compell obedience here, unless you strike at the root of this rebellion, by crushing its abettors and supporters at *home*. Every other remedy is but palliative: and experience ought ere this to have opened your eyes and made you decided,—if you are not afraid to do your duty. An act of attainder ought also to have passed, to make distinctions in guilt, and to form suspicions among their demagogues: and rewards ought to be offered for apprehending the most persecuting and atrocious offenders in every Province. This conduct, in its consequences, would prove more truly merciful to the country at large, than all our boasted lenity hitherto has been, or ever will be. God forbid that I should wish one life to be taken away, unless for the public advantage! But when I perceive that we spare our enemies at the expence of our friends, and that the Rebellion feeds, as it were, and fattens, on the distresses of the Loyalists,—I can no longer approve of *such* lenient measures; nor do I think the King's affairs are ever likely to do well, while the sceptre here is swayed by *Commissioners of the Peace*, rather than by Admirals and Generals.

General CLINTON, to the surprize of every one,

one, is left to command on this Island. Of course, should any accident befall General HOWE, the command of the expedition must devolve upon one younger than Sir HENRY! It is said he is much dissatisfied. No advice is asked, and information coldly received; of course, they are very imperfectly informed on all occasions. Please to present my compliments to all our common connexions;—tell Sir W^m. —, that he shall hear from me the next opportunity; and believe me ever, most sincerely, Your's, &c. &c. &c.

NEW-YORK, Sept. 22. 1777.

AS we have seldom any *direct* intelligence from our chief Commanders, whether good or bad luck befalls them, we are glad to pick up a little now and then from the Rebel Newspapers; which are stolen in upon us by some refugee or deserter.—In this manner then we understand, that there has been an engagement between General HOWE and WASHINGTON at *Brandiwine* near *Wilmington* in *Pennsylvania*; in which action it would seem that the Rebels were defeated, and ran off 14 miles to *Chester*, with the loss of eight pieces of cannon, and *blankets* innumerable: the loss of men, on either side, not ascertained; but They insinuate that ours is much the greater. It is indeed whispered, that our Light Infantry suffered much, in passing some creek in the face of the Rebel

Rebel Army. Where General HOWE is now, or what he is about, we can only guess from what *other* Generals would do, were they in his situation: yet how often have we been deceived here by that rule of judging!

We know still less than this, of the movements and situation of the army under General BURGOYNE. Ever since the 6th of August last, we have not had the least certain intelligence from that quarter. He was then at Fort *Edward*.—It is said by some, that Colonels ST LEGER and Sir JOHN JOHNSON have been obliged to retire from before Fort *Stanwix*; others say, that they have taken it by surprize: the first, I fear, is the truth. Such is our information here; and I suspect, our Leaders know no more. Never was there a war conducted as this has been. *Intelligence* and *dispatch* are the very life and soul of military operation: *secrecy* is with *us* the sole merit,—perhaps for obvious reasons.

General CLINTON lately made a successful incursion into the *Jerseys*; and returned with a large quantity of cattle, &c. though not without being molested. The very ragamuffin *Militia* now dare not only smell powder, but kill a *Redcoat*, with as much indifference as if they had never feared such an animal. Blessed effects of lenity and *proclamations*!

Your's sincerely, &c. &c.

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NEW-YORK, NOV. 10. 1777.

BEFORE this reaches you, you must have heard that General BURGOYNE has been under the necessity, through want of provisions, and by other disasters, to surrender himself and his Army to General GATES, who opposed him with near 20,000 men. There has been a strange fatality in this affair. We had an army of about 30,000 men, lying idle here till the latter end of *July*: yet no attempt was made to open *Hudson's River*; through which channel only, provisions and other necessaries could be sent to BURGOYNE.

When General HOWE went to the *Southward*, he left no more troops here than what were barely sufficient to defend the place: so that nothing could be undertaken, offensively, against the Rebels, till about the beginning of *October*; when General ROBERTSON arrived, with a reinforcement of near 2000 men. General Sir HENRY CLINTON, immediately after this, formed an expedition against the *Highlands*; and, on the sixth of *October*, took the Rebel Forts by storm. This was one of the most brilliant exploits of the whole campaign; in which our new-raised corps very much distinguished themselves. Had he commanded so many troops as to have been able to execute this service a month sooner, the Northern Army might not only have been safe, but triumphant. As the very *reverse* of this hath happened,—though it is of little consequence to the general


ral contest, yet will it greatly animate the Rebels of *New England*, and be severely felt by us in this neighbourhood. All the necessaries of life are become enormously dear. The Rebelious Army is collecting around us, and we shall doubtless be attacked: but we do not fear them; and, by the blessing of Heaven, we hope to make them retreat somewhat faster than they advance. We have about 4000 regular troops, and 2000 inhabitants bearing arms, besides the shipping.—On such occasions it is the indispensable duty of every man to step forth: for my own part, though on the wrong side of my grand climacteric, yet, blessed with a good share of strength and animal-spirits, I am fully determined to run every hazard with my fellow-citizens, and to decline no danger that it may be necessary to encounter for our common preservation. I wish not to survive the destruction of this place, or its capture by the Rebels.

General HOWE is in possession of *Philadelphia*. He has defeated the Rebels twice, and I hope will defeat them again. Nothing decisive, however, can be expected from this campaign. You must send us over fifteen or twenty thousand men the next year, if encouragement is not given for raising men here, who are much better than *foreigners*.

The Rebels are in the utmost distress for Salt and Cloathing. Last winter it was computed they had lost—the *greatest* part of them, you may be sure, by sickness—not fewer than *forty thousand*; it is supposed their loss, at this day,

does not fall short of *sixty thousand*;—a most ruinous circumstance to this country, where population is so thin, and men so much wanted. The Rebels, however, are so elated with General BURGOYNE'S misfortune, that I am confident they will risque another campaign: nay, I am as sure as I am of my own existence, that the *Congress* will not recede from their claim of *Independency*, so long as there is a man mad enough to stand by them.

Your's, affectionately, &c. &c.



NEW-YORK, NOV. 19. 1777.

YOU see I do not stand upon ceremony, having heard nothing from you since I wrote last. Matters here go on, as I have long expected, from bad to worse. General BURGOYNE and his whole Army are prisoners with the Rebels, to be exchanged, or to be sent back to *England* from *Boston*, in *English* transports; so soon as Lord HOWE pleases to send them. General HOWE is now at *Philadelphia*, where he proposes to fix his head-quarters for this winter: he is accordingly fortifying the grounds around it; yet we are not yet assured, that the Rebel Fleet has been subdued, or the forts on *Mud-Island* and *Red-Bank* taken. Colonel DONOP, with his *Hessians*, has been lately repulsed from the latter, with the loss of three hundred men; and, in attacking *Mud-Island*, we lost the *Augusta* Man of War, and *Merlin* Sloop, both

both burnt in sight of the Rebel Fleet, which then lay above, and under protection of those forts, or rather between them. So that the Rebels still possess that part of *Delaware-River* between the *City* and *Mud-Island*; our ships being hindered by the *Chevaux de Frises*, from going up higher.—This is a droll situation of the two fleets: but, unless altered within these ten days, it is still the case. We have indeed been told, that the forts are taken; but as yet we are not assured of it. General WASHINGTON is again at *German-Town*. PUTNAM, it is said, is to keep us at bay towards *King's Bridge*; whilst another body of Rebels is to lay hold of *Long-Island*, and from thence to destroy this Town, or its *remains*. To obviate these threats, we are repairing the Rebel Works at *Brooklyne*, or part of them: and two thousand Inhabitants have offered their service for our common defence. They were first formed into companies, and divided into two battalions. We have about six thousand men besides, to defend the island, with General CLINTON; who, it is said, is so disgusted, that he has desired leave to go home. Indeed every one is disgusted here, who will speak out. There has been such a series of blunders, from the first landing of the troops on *Long-Island*,—to say nothing of their flight from *Boston*,—to this present hour; that there is no possibility of accounting for them on any other principle but strength of Skull: for I would fain hope the Pride of Family would not permit him to act in conformity to the

the villanous Opposition. Opportunities lost are never to be regained. The bravery of the *British* ensures them victory, go where they will: accordingly, they have gained *many* victories. But what are the Advantages gained by our victories? None. The Rebellion is more established, more general than ever. The Rebels have been made Soldiers by our lessons: they even attack the King's troops in battle-array, as was the case at *German-Town*. The minds of the people are more and more alienated, from the slowness of relief, or from being left at the mercy of the Rebels after having shewn their loyalty. There never was, even in the *army*, such general murmuring; such general complaints in every department. As to the military manœuvres, there has been such a concatenation of blunders, as no drill Serjeant would have been guilty of. To instance a few. After landing on *Long-Island*, part of the army went to *Flat-Bush*; and there halted, because a few shot were fired at them from the woods; whereas they should have gone half a mile farther, to the Heights between *Flat-Bush* and *Brooklyne*; where they would have been in perfect security. The Rebels seeing this, immediately secured themselves there; and kept the army at bay, till the 27th of August. Again: After the defeat on the 27th, the troops and officers were eager to pursue the flying enemy into their lines, which could have been very easily forced; and where, had the ships been ordered up at the same time, between the island and town,

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eight thousand Rebels, with General WASHINGTON himself, must have been either killed or taken prisoners.

Again: After letting these Rebels steal away in the night, the General remained *three weeks*, before he attempted *York Island*; without any apparent reason for such delay: and when he did make a shew of attacking it, he landed in the *middle* of it, instead of throwing his army and the fleet around it by *King's Bridge*, and thereby hemming in the whole Rebel Forces at once.

Four weeks after taking *New York*, he landed on *Frog's Neck*; from whence he could not get upon the *continent*, by reason of the causeway's being broken down, and works erected to oppose him; whereby five days were lost most needlessly; twenty other places being open to him, where he might have landed without the least opposition or molestation. And again, on the *White Plains*, after gaining a hill, by which the rebel army was totally exposed in flank,—though he gained it with the loss of some hundreds of men,—he never took any advantage of it; but allowed the Rebels to get off, and fortify themselves a few miles farther. The opportunity then lost has been confessed by General LEE, who was there; and great was his surprize that no advantage was made of the situation of the Rebel army at that time.

Again: When Lord CORNWALLIS carried a body of troops over to the *Ferseys*, and had pursued

fued the Rebels to the river *Raritan*, where, or at *Brunswick*, his instructions *limited* his progress; his Lordship sent an exprefs to General HOWE, then at *New York*, acquainting him, that by a brisk purfuit he could entirely difperfe WASHINGTON's army, and feize his heavy baggage and artillery before he could pafs the *Delaware*. General HOWE returned for answer, "That he was juft then fealing fome letters, and would be with him in perfon immediately;" but did not, however, come in *fix days*; by which time WASHINGTON fecured every thing.

If thefe are not *intentional* neglects and delays, they are d——d like them.

Should I follow him through the other operations fince thefe blunders, there are equal fources of cenfure, on many other occafions; particularly, when, to the amazement and with the indignation of even the common foldiers, he turned his back upon WASHINGTON, at *Morris-Town* in *Jerfey*.

Why, my good Sir, do not you put pen to paper, when you have fuch a field to work upon? *America*, if not already loft, muft infallibly *be* loft, by fuch conduct. I doubt indeed if it be poffible to make up the lee-way, occafioned by the conduct of the Commander in *Canada*, and of HOWE here. If they are allowed to *mean* well, they certainly do not *act* well: and mens actions are the moft certain marks of their intentions. You cannot furely be indifferent to the fate of *America*. Try if you cannot turn
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the attention of the people to what is doing, or rather what is *not* doing, on this Continent.

Should you think of *writing* any thing, let it be known too, that the General has been all along deficient in Intelligence; owing to his being as inaccessible to a cloth-coloured coat, as an Eastern Monarch: nay, he is often inaccessible to his own officers, even upon business. Yet business, or writing, are the usual excuses; in spite of his well-known *aversion* to business. He is *reported* to be as obstinate as a mule, when once he has formed his opinion; and but too frequently forms his opinions of men and things from pride, or the notions of his *Aids du Camp*. He seldom forgives opposition to his will, or disapprobation of his conduct. *Lord Howe*, however, is spoken of very differently; as a well-meaning, pains-taking man; always affable, and easy of access. Yet even with respect to *his* conduct, as *Admiral*, it is observed, that the Ports of *Charles-Town* and *Boston* have supplied the Rebels with all necessary cloathing and arms; and that multitudes of captures are carried into those Harbours.


P. S. Nov^r. 14. Nothing material from the *Delaware*. It is said with great confidence, that *Mud-Island* and *Red-Bank* Forts are taken. But we are beneath the notice of our *Par nobile Fratrum*. We have accounts from them perhaps once a month at most; generally in two months. Frequently our intelligence comes from *England*; unless we

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accidentally meet with a Rebel Newspaper. All, in short, is mystery. Nobody dares speak. Military law and courts-martial keep every tongue in order: and nothing can be *printed*, unless approved of by our *rulers*. *Their* Master is not so much dreaded.

With due compliments to good Mrs —, and all friends, I am, Dear Sir,
Your's most affectionately, &c. &c.



NEW-YORK, Dec. 16. 1777.

SINCE I wrote to you last, great events have happened in this country. Where do you find in the *British Annals*, that a disciplined gallant Army ever surrendered themselves, with arms in their hands, to a Militia,—to a Rabble? Never was such a series of blunders, as those that have been committed by every Commander in Chief in *America*, in story, romance, or ballad. BURGOYNE's *army* was never engaged: every thing was done by *detachment*. And after his first victory at *Saratoga*, he never pursued; though GATES had only Militia in his lines. In the last action, where BURGOYNE was worsted, only a small part of his *army* was engaged; and *that* drawn up in the most disadvantageous manner, in battalions, on a plain, clear ground, against the Rebels secured by large trees, &c. After all this, he had provisions sufficient to have retreated any whither;

ther; and might even have brought off most of his sick and wounded; could he and his people have had resolution enough to destroy their enormous train of artillery and baggage, or even to spike up their cannon. Nay, when he surrendered,—after retreating ten miles in two days, without pursuit, he might have immediately pushed across the river; as GATES suspected some stratagem, and did not pursue, till he was convinced of BURGOYNE's distress, by his having left his *hospital* behind. Then a party of Militia were ordered to post themselves at the Ford, to hinder BURGOYNE's passing: and those Militia were about one Thousand. Could not *British* Soldiers force such a passage? But supposing this attempt hazardous, they could have proceeded up the river, opposite to Fort *Edward*, or still further, if necessary, to the Falls above it. It was ill-judged in him to pass Fort *Edward* at all, till he was assured of assistance from this place, or till he found, by calculating chances, that he was able to force his way Himself. Had he remained at Fort *Edward*, the Rebels would not have ventured to have done any material mischief between him and *Ticonderoga*, especially while the *Indians* continued with him; or they would not have attempted it with Impunity. I know that country well, and speak from my own observation. In short, from every thing I see, *America* seems to be intentionally given up, and the interest and glory of *Britain* sacrificed to party, and a junto of villains within her own bowels.

I much applaud the Speech of the Archbishop of *York*, and much more his Motion in the House of Lords: for it has long been my opinion, that the genuine *Independents* in your country, are not, in heart, a bit more loyal, or better subjects, than their brethren on this side of the Atlantic. How is that rebel-hearted Chief C——N thought of among you? Such a set!

Adieu. Your's affectionately, &c. &c.



NEW-YORK, Jan. 17. 1778.

A THOUSAND thanks to you, my dear Sir, for your very kindly, comforting, and humane letter, so long ago as early in the last year; which, be assured, I should not have been deficient in answering, soon after the receipt of it, had I not been in full hope of seeing a speedy end put to this cursed, wicked, and unnatural rebellion; and that we should have had you, long ere this, happy again with your many loyal and hearty friends in this country. But what a change of circumstances and prospects have we lately experienced; and what mortifying insults have not the *British* arms sustained! However, I thank GOD for his goodness in still enabling me to adhere to my principles: the last efforts of my life shall be devoted to the service of my King and Country.

It is true, every thing I had, has fallen into the hands of the Rebels: but all this I could submit

submit to, almost without any complaint,—Providence having taken away my only son, before he could feel the distresses in which his father has been involved, and I being therefore left little more than a single man,—had I but a Chance of seeing those worst of all villains brought to a *sense of their duty*. But sorry I am to say, that none are so likely, according to present appearances, to be Sufferers, as the King's staunchest and most loyal subjects: and, were you here, it would make you almost distracted, as it does me, to behold the greatest scoundrels now going publicly through this city, and by many much noticed. But, Heaven be praised, I have defiled my hands with none of them: nor shall I, though there remained not another individual of my opinion. These things, you will own, are sufficiently provoking: But, to see that vilest of all men, LEE, parading along our streets without controul, on foot, or on horseback, as he pleases, is above all bearing and forbearance: one, who had insulted the SOVEREIGN, more than any other person in the whole country; and who had the greatest hand in the destruction of *this City*; by which so many of your friends were reduced at once from affluence to penury. The very idea makes my blood boil in my veins; and, if I do not therefore drop my pen, I am sure I shall use some language that might be better suppressed. Adieu. Heaven defend us, and give us better times!

Your's, most affectionately, &c. &c.

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NEW-YORK, Jan. 25. 1778.

“DURING the last campaign, (if a campaign it can be called), I have endeavoured in all my letters to account for General HOWE’s conduct in the most favourable manner I could for Him. Common Charity taught me not to doubt but that he *meant* well; and his character, as a Soldier, made me pretty certain he would also *do* well, at the head of an Army that the World could scarcely equal. Whatever might be the *political* principles of the HOWES; that is, whether they were ministerial or anti-ministerial men; it was plain, the trust reposed in them by the King was very great;—that their military characters were at stake; and that they were accountable to a great and jealous Nation, that would not *long* suffer themselves to be abused and trifled with; but who are also ever ready to reward—most nobly to reward—the merits of men in their station. It was moreover said, that they were men of Ambition, and who thirsted for Fame. All these considerations induced me to think, that every thing that *could* be done *would* have been done, to extinguish a Rebellion, the Existence of which for so long a time, had already become highly reproachful to *Great Britain*; especially as little more was necessary to accomplish the business, than attention, activity, and vigilance, in the Commander in Chief. Besides, men of the best sense in the Army, talked much of plans being laid at head-quarters, that would put success beyond

beyond all doubt or peradventure. I could not therefore help blaming my friends, the *Growlers*, for their forwardness in finding fault; because I thought General HOWE understood his own business full as well as They. These motives and sentiments, I dare say, you will commend, as honest, candid, and natural. Honest as they really were, the Event of things has almost made me blush for them. I am ashamed to think, how much my simplicity has exposed my want of penetration.

“ It is asserted (and I think it cannot be denied) that the sole reason why the Rebel Army was not entirely destroyed, and the Rebellion itself totally annihilated in the Fall of 1776, was because the facility of doing it was so manifest, and the opportunities so frequent, that the Congress, WASHINGTON, and his ragamuffins, were become contemptible; and were therefore considered as scarce worth the notice and attention of the Army, before whom they were every where flying in the most pitiful plight, and frightened out of their senses. The most unpardonable negligence in not pursuing them in this wretched condition, even across the *Delaware*, gave them time to breathe. The activity of WASHINGTON, and the *Congress*, soon increased to six or seven thousand the shattered remains of their army, which, at the time they fled across to *Philadelphia*, did not much exceed *two thousand men*. They soon perceived that General HOWE meant to do no more that campaign, but to rest quietly in his

his cantonments during the winter season. This inactivity, together with the extreme imprudence of giving the *Hessians*, under Colonel RALLE, the advanced posts of the army at *Trenton*, determined WASHINGTON to make a push. He succeeded; surpris'd the *Hessians*, who were busy in plundering; regardless of their duty, though timely enough informed to be on their guard. This manœuvre put the King's troops into some confusion, and gave WASHINGTON Consequence. He had the address to fix himself in the mountain near *Boundbrook*; from whence he kept an army of twice his number in perpetual alarm and harra's during all the winter.

“ All this time General HOWE was at *New-York* in the lap of Ease; or rather, amusing himself in the *lap* of a Mrs L—g, who is the very *Cleopatra* to this *Anthony* of ours. But yet it was not doubted, but that full and ample revenge would be taken on WASHINGTON and his crew, early in the spring. The season, even untill the month of *June*, was trifled away on pretence of hearing from *poor* BURGOYNE, and settling plans great and effectual. The campaign was at last opened with a Feint or two to draw WASHINGTON out of his strong-holds; which not succeeding, to the astonishment of the whole Army and of every body else, the troops were on a sudden withdrawn from the *Jerseys*, and were embarked from *Staten-Island* on board transports. The troops growled at the ignominy of something that looked very like a
retreat;

retreat; whilst other people were either stung with disappointment, or lost in silent wonder at what could be intended by so mysterious a conduct. This murmuring, vexation, and wonder, were greatly increased during the three weeks the troops lay embarked at *Staten-Island*. People both in and out of the army grew violent in their opinions: some would have it they were going to the Eastward; others, to the Southward; while a third party very cunningly imagined, from the so tedious delay before they sailed—that the whole was no more than a Scheme, the more surely and effectually to put WASHINGTON off his guard, and draw him out of his strong camp. These disputes and altercations were at last put an end to, by laying wagers about the matter; and by hints from head-quarters, that his Excellency, ever attentive to the *sparing* of his Gallant Troops, could not bear the idea of risking two or three thousand brave men to be sacrificed by “*base scum, and dunghill villains*,” but had resolved on a plan that would as effectually do their business without the risk of such a loss. The reasons appeared plausible and commendable; and confidence in the General still gave hopes, that he would soon destroy the rascals, though no man could tell *how*. But lo! *parturiunt montes, et nascitur ridiculus mus*. We are at the middle of Winter; the Campaign is at an end. BURGOYNE and his Army are sacrificed, for want of support and

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assistance. We have taken *Philadelphia* by the roundabout road of *Chesapeak-Bay*, which might have been done with ten times the ease by marching forty or fifty miles in April last. Rebellion, which a twelvemonth ago was really a contemptible Pigmy, is now in appearance become a Giant, more dreadful to the minds of men, than *Polyphemus* of old, or the sons of *Anak*.

From the above short history of undubitable facts, which, if you please, I will take the liberty of calling, however improperly, the *Transactions* of the Campaign, you will not wonder that peoples' mouths should be pretty freely opened. It has indeed been long said, from the evident attention and predilection that the Commissioners have shewn to persons, who have either been actively Rebels, or rebelliously inclined, that they are too much affected with the Anti-ministerial Poison. This may, however, be little more than surmise. It is much more probable, that the shameful inactivity and trifling of last year has been the consequence of the General's having fixed on no one certain Plan of operations; of his having few men of military knowledge or experience about him; of his suffering himself to be too much influenced by a pack of self-interested puppies, who push their fortunes by administering to his pleasures and foibles; and who seem not to care how long the Rebellion lasts, provided they are but lining their own pockets. All the while,
however,

however, the great business of the Nation seems neglected, either through ignorance, mismanagement, or design. A great deal has been placed to the account of the General's fondness for, and attachment to, Mrs L——g; who is beyond compare the Greatest Woman in the world; to whom all Men must pay their court, if they hope for Preferment. She is, however, far advanced in her pregnancy, and was left at *New-York*. But then the General has found another *Desdemona* at *Philadelphia*, even the pretty Miss ———, who is now his Excellency's flirt; whilst some known Adherents to the *American* cause, are become the greatest and most consequential men at head-quarters. It is even freely and confidently said by the Army, that it was by their influence, and by their persuasions, that the General left the *Ferseys*, and went the way he did to *Philadelphia*. You think, I dare say, I am descending to tea-table chat and little scandal. What I tell you, I really believe to be true; and you will, at some time, hear such evidence of it, as will surprise you. *O Tempora! O Mores!*

As a farther allegation against General HOWE, it was long ago said, that he was jealous of the superior merit of Generals BURGoyNE and CLINTON; whom he at all times, and on all occasions, endeavoured to thwart, by every means in his power: and that his partiality to certain Favourites of little worth or knowledge is so great and so evident, that

many of the best Officers in the Army are gone or are going home disgusted.

In the Navy also there are complaints. So, you will say, there ever were, and ever will be. Every Admiral has his friends to provide for, and *make*, as they call it, either as Lieutenants or Captains. But that is not the matter. *Jack* is honest; piously wishes for a war with *France* or *Spain*; and damns the Rebellion, because it is a *partial* service. What they mean is, that certain Favourites *only* are kept constantly cruising; whilst others are kept, for months, in port, without any other apparent cause, at the same time. The Rebel Ports to the Eastward, and especially to the Southward, have been left open and unguarded for months: by which means, the Congress and their Army have been tolerably well supplied with arms, ammunition, cloathing, and several other necessaries, to the great encouragement of the Rebels.

Whether all the above causes, or how many, predominated; or whether there are not other causes for protracting this hellish Rebellion; I cannot take upon me to determine: nor is it of any consequence. It is quite enough, and, GOD knows, bad enough too, that we are well convinced there has been a most shameful and unpardonable protraction and delay; which must have proceeded from ignorance, mismanagement, or design. It is true, indeed, the Friends of the HOWES, who seem to wish at all times that a veil was thrown over the transactions

tions of 1776, do now most impudently insist upon it, and assert, that the Ministry *alone* have guided and directed the measures and operations of this last year; and, as a proof, they refer us to a Letter (the Date of which I have forgot) from General HOWE to Lord GEORGE GERMAINE; in which he hints "That he was acting *in pursuance to the general plan*," or words to that effect. Nay, they also insinuate, that the delays complained of are far from being disagreeable to Administration; who (they say) consider it as good policy to prolong the war for some time, in order the more effectually to distress and impoverish the Colonies, and by that means prevent future rebellions. Monstrous, absurd, and impossible as these assertions are, there are men of tolerable understanding who have suffered themselves to be so far imposed upon by these people as to believe them. To some such, whom I met with in *New York* last week, I have been obliged to read that paragraph in your Letter which directly contradicts every such ridiculous supposition.

Since, then, you see, and every man in the Kingdom *must* see, that notwithstanding *all* you have hitherto done at home, (and you have certainly done full enough to have made an end of this Rebellion long ago, had your affairs been properly managed), this hydra-headed monster of Rebellion still continues to have a formidable appearance; surely there can be no occasion for further arguments to prove the *absolute*

solute necessity of your immediate most serious and most spirited exertions. You owe thus much to your own honour, your own glory, and your own prosperity: and *our* future happiness and peace depend upon those exertions. We are indeed confident you will send us with pleasure, plenty of Men, and every other requisite of Provision, Ammunition, &c. But remember, that all this will not do without Abilities, Vigilance, and Attention. Merciful God! have you not men enough in the whole *British* Empire, who have public virtue, abilities, and experience, sufficient to lead your gallant Soldiers to the Field? For shame, rouse yourselves, look about you, no longer suffer yourselves to be trifled with and imposed upon so egregiously. I am ashamed to think you should be laughed at by Foreigners, for suffering yourselves to be so long bullied by the basest Vermin in the creation.

Notwithstanding we all have the greatest reason to be dissatisfied with the dilatory manner of carrying on the War, which has given the Rebellion *the appearance* of being formidable; yet I am far from supposing, and therefore would not be understood to mean, that it *really is so*. The Congress, their Generals and Army, have betrayed manifest signs of confusion and dismay; especially since the resolution of the *French* Court has been known. The common people amongst them are tired, and heart-sick, at finding themselves perpetually

tually harassed; deprived of all the comforts, and of many of the necessaries, of life; and, besides all that, loaded with excessive *taxes*, that are exacted from them in several of the Governments, or *States* as they are called, with the utmost rigour; to *avoid* which, they had been *told*, was the sole cause of the opposition to Government: so that there can be but little doubt, that the Phantom will soon vanish away before the face of Vigour and Activity. Indeed we are taught to believe, that they have begun to think and talk seriously about treating with the Commissioners; and for that purpose had attempted to have the vote of Independency rescinded; which, though it did not succeed at that time, it is expected, soon will; and *then* they hope to treat: for it is said, the Commissioners are willing to treat with them. Surely nothing could have set us into such a rage, as this same idea of *treating* with a pack of Scoundrels; who, after they have endeavoured to overturn Government, by the most unheard-of villanies that ever disgraced Barbarians, and finding they are not likely to succeed in their infernal schemes, must then pretend to *treat*. But, is it possible to conceive, you should so miserably demean yourselves, as to negotiate with such Miscreants? I cannot, I will not, believe you can be guilty of a conduct so derogatory to your honour; and so contrary to Justice, and the plainest Policy.

As a further mortification to us, and to you
too,

too, the Congress refuse to let General BURG-
GOYNE and his Troops go home, agreeable
to the tenor of the Convention. We suspected
thus much some time ago. SAMUEL ADAMS
was dispatched by the Congress, as soon as they
got intelligence of the affair, in order to ma-
nage this business. The convention expressly
mentions that BURGGOYNE and his army were
to embark on board *British* transports at *Boston*;
in case no Exchange should take place. But
Lord HOWE sent the transports to *Rhode-Island*,
for the troops to embark *there*. Why, in the
name of common sense, did he do so? Had he
indeed sent them to *Boston*, it is probable, A-
DAMS would have found out some *New-Eng-
land* chicanery to have prevented the troops from
going home: but had his Lordship studied for
seven years, he could not have hit upon a bet-
ter way of serving the Rebels. The Troops are
effectually prevented from going home, and
relieving the Garrisons that would have been
sent hither to replace them; whilst the *Congress*
are furnished with the Pretence, that they were
ready to abide by the terms of the Convention,
if Lord HOWE himself had not chosen to act
contrary to them.

☞ The above Letter was printed in Hand-bills in March
1778, and delivered to the Members of both Houses of Parlia-
ment.

NEW-YORK, January 26. 1778.

I THANK you for your favour of October the 7th; for the trouble which you have had on my account; and for all those instances of attention, to myself and connections, which make us so much your debtors.

I wish I had something clever to communicate to you in return: but every thing on this side of the water is most confoundedly out of joint. I wish it may be better with *you*; and I hope it is. I expect, I *believe*, that the Nation will exert itself; support its own honour and dignity; and finally crush this infernal Rebellion. But, my dear Sir, this must be done by new Measures; and whether new Measures will ever be adopted without new Men, I know not: I think it, however, improbable.

The last campaign seems to have been conducted without any Plan. If General BURGoyNE was to receive no succours from this quarter, his expedition, wherever it may have originated, was downright *Quixotism*: and no sooner was it known that Lord HOWE, &c. were gone to the *Southward*, than the failure of that expedition was prognosticated by many of the King's loyal subjects in this City: tho' we little thought that such an *unparalleled* disgrace was to befall the *British* Arms.

It can scarcely escape your observation, that Sir WILLIAM HOWE, by going up the *Delaware*, might have landed at, or near, the mouth of *Brandiwine*, within *fourteen* miles of the

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head of *Elk*, where he disembarked his troops at last. He would thereby have saved a circuit of *four or five hundred miles*, and *four or five weeks* in point of *time*; and might easily have been at *Philadelphia*, before WASHINGTON could have marched from the *Highlands*, on the west side of *Hudson's River*, where he was then encamped, to oppose him.—But it is in vain for me to attempt any explanation of our inexplicable military operations. What vexes me most is, to see the rascally manner in which every thing is conducted in the commissarial way. The deputies, and sub-deputies, and subter-sub-deputies,—for we have them of every degree,—are all growing rich; and too much so at the expence of the poor People; whose affections are thereby alienated from *Great Britain*, and their confidence in her utterly annihilated. What do you think of *forty thousand pounds*,—some say more than *thrice* that sum,—being made at one stroke; by *fair cheating*, in the *waggon-department*? I do not mean by cheating the *Government*;—that is a matter of course, for which practice immemorial may be pleaded;—but by defrauding the Farmers of *Long and Staten Island*: and yet I am *told* this may be demonstrated.

I have long been of opinion, that none but vigorous and severe methods could ever conquer this rebellion; and I have *seen* enough to confirm me in this judgment. I wish the experiment were tried, in *New England* particularly. Their *trade* would thereby be put an end to;

to; distress would then come full speed upon them, and in a short time bring them to *feel* as well as *reason*.

LEE is out of confinement, on his parole; and is exceedingly caressed by some of our principal officers. In truth, although we deny the Independency of the American *States* in Words, we treat them as such in every instance that falls under my observation. And the *Congress*, it seems, are now endeavouring to get an implied acknowledgment of it from the *King*; by refusing to permit General BURGOYNE and his Army to go home according to the convention, till that convention shall be ratified by his *Majesty*, as it has been by the *Congress*.

We flatter ourselves that the Rebels are in want of some necessary Cloathing, Salt, Rum, &c.; and that Provisions are not over-plenty with them. But I suspect they are better supplied than we are willing to suppose. They make a good deal of Salt in *Jersey* and *New England*; and some gets into their Ports in spite of the vigilance, or rather negligence, of our Navy. The Officers, however, I believe, do their duty, on the stations where they are ordered; but the number of harbours is very great, and many of them are not attended to. God bless you! If you stay in *England* till this Rebellion is over, I fear it will be long before we see you. Continue however to love me, and believe me ever Your's, &c. &c.

Extract of another LETTER of the same Date.

I HAVE frequently heard *of* you lately, but not *from* you; for which I blame myself only. Indeed I am absolutely inexcusable for having neglected you so long. You will, however, be so good as to attribute it to any cause rather than to the want of friendship. If I thought an apology absolutely necessary, I would endeavour to make one: but I am persuaded you are too much of a Christian to withhold your forgiveness, after an acknowledgment of the fault, and repentance. At least, you are more so than that whimsical *Frenchman* was, who said “ he thought himself obliged to forgive his *enemies*, but not his *friends*.”

I have deferred writing to you for some time past, in hopes that I might have something to communicate which might operate as a peace-offering: but I am obliged at last to approach you empty-handed. There is indeed nothing here that can give you Pleasure. All is one continued scene of chagrin, vexation, and disappointment. That which we have long been hoping for, seems as far distant as ever. The *Northern Army* is as it were annihilated; and General HOWE snug in *Philadelphia*; while WASHINGTON keeps possession of the *country*. —Can there be a more preposterous piece of conduct, than to suffer the Rebel Army to range uncontrolled, and to content ourselves with the capture of a few *Towns*, which would be ours of course if that Army were destroyed? It has,

has, more than once, been in our power to have done it effectually. This the Rebels themselves acknowledge. But those glorious opportunities have been neglected, and the war protracted at the hazard of ruining the Country; which nothing can prevent, but a Change of Men and Measures.

Whether our present Chief blunders through want of capacity, or by design, I will not pretend to determine: but so frequent and so gross have those blunders been, that the Rebels in a good measure build their hopes upon them. Their common daily toast, I am told, is, "May General HOWE continue in command." A Member of *Congress*, early last Summer, told a Lady of your acquaintance, who lives between *New York* and *Albany*, and was expressing her apprehensions of what might happen on General HOWE's marching that way to meet BURGoyNE, "That she need give herself no uneasiness upon that score; for he could venture to assure her, that He would not take that Route." Being asked his reason for thinking so, he replied, "Because it was the very thing he ought to do." And the event has justified his assertion.—He continued in *Jersey*, at the head of the finest Army in the world, with WASHINGTON at his elbow, whom he suffered to remain quite easy and unmolested, till half the season of Action was over: then, gently took wing—coasted along the *Atlantic*—looked into the *Delaware*—wheeled about—took a circuit into *Chesapeak-Bay*,—and, after six weeks diversion

sion of that kind—landed at the head of *Elk*,—from whence he fought his way to *Philadelphia*—had just Time to provide himself with winter-quarters, and so—ended the campaign. BURGOYNE, with his small Army, after the most spirited exertions, was left to fall a Sacrifice; and the fair hopes which we had entertained, of the Eastern Governments making their submission, and of approaching Peace, vanished into nothing.—Common sense revolts at such conduct. But I have done. It would have given me pleasure to have represented matters in a more favourable light; for I hate to speak evil of such as are in authority: but it was impossible; and my feelings upon the occasion were such, that I could not restrain my indignation. All happiness attend *you*: the loss of my most dear and most *loyal* Mrs —, (I am sure you condole with me on that most unfortunate Event!) has “made me poor indeed;” but, in *all* circumstances, I am ever
 Your's, &c. &c.



NEW-YORK, January 27. 1778.

YOU are the only person, amongst *all* our correspondents in *England*, who have expressed the least doubt concerning General BURGOYNE and his Army. Long ere This you must have found, that your suspicions were too well grounded: but you knew his strength; a circumstance of which we were almost totally ignorant,

ignorant, untill the unhappy hour in which we had the certain news of his misfortune. We indeed knew full well the numberless difficulties and embarrassments he had to encounter: but then we knew also his spirit, his assiduity, and his perseverance. And besides, we were taught to believe that his army consisted of ten thousand *regular* Troops, besides *Indians*, *Canadians*, and *Refugees*: a force which we thought sufficient to ensure success, in spite of all the efforts of the Eastern Colonies. And this, in all human probability, would still have been the happy case, either had General BURGOYNE's Army been all *British*, or General HOWE been pleased to send a respectable detachment, with plenty of provisions, &c. up the *North River*. Why he did not, I believe no man but himself can devise. If he really *knew* BURGOYNE's situation, he was unpardonable; but supposing he did not know it, the propriety of making such a movement was so evident, that I cannot conceive how he can make his excuse to Government; unless indeed he could prove that he had offered his service to BURGOYNE, and that it was refused; which some of Mr HOWE's friends have *said*, though not a man believes them.— Now, had he detached three or four thousand regular troops, with the new-raised corps, and left orders with General CLINTON to have pushed up the *North River* to *Albany*, some time about the middle of August, when it might have been certain that BURGOYNE was pretty well advanced towards that place; a step that might

might have undoubtedly been taken as easily *then*, as it was with *half* the force in *October*, *when it was too late*; we may, I think, venture to assert with great confidence, that the Northern Army would have been saved—the communication by the River secured and kept open, to the very great advantage of the troops, as well as of the *loyal* Inhabitants throughout the Province—the designs of Government completely accomplished,—and Rebellion, which has *now* a much more formidable *appearance* than it had a year ago, would have been at the last gasp, if not totally expired.—To be convinced of all these things, you have only to attend to that detail of proceedings which I transmitted to Lord ———, with a particular request that his Lordship would communicate the contents to you. For which reason it will be enough for me to add on this head,—and I am sure it will be full enough for your patience to bear,—That we have the farther mortification to find, that the *Congress* will neither suffer BURGOYNE nor his Troops to embark for *England*: the reason is, it seems, Lord HOWE's choosing to send the Transports to *Rhode-Island*, rather than to *Boston*, which was the very place fixed on by the Convention for the Embarkation. Thus the ends of the Rebels are perpetually answered by our own negligence, folly, or something worse than either. The troops cannot now sail from *Boston* till *Spring*; and so you will be effectually prevented from sending over hither those troops that
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would have been relieved in garrison by BURGOYNE's Army. How strange, and how provoking, are such proceedings! But indeed there is something in the conduct of the Commissioners so very problematical, that I no longer wonder to hear the cry almost universal against them.

It is said, and I confess with great appearance of truth, that they are both antiministerial men, and their minds poisoned by faction: That they have endeavoured by every means to *spare* the Rebellion, in order to give It and the Rebels an air of consequence at home; thereby intending to answer the manifold purposes of covering the General's inactivity and dilatory conduct; magnifying his military character in the eyes of the Nation, when he shall at last think proper to put an End to the war; giving time to several Favourites to make most enormous sums of money; and, in some measure, compelling Administration to save the Rebels and their Estates by *treating* with them,—contrary to the honour of the nation, contrary to justice and sound policy: That General HOWE has made a wanton and cruel sacrifice of General BURGOYNE to his jealousy of BURGOYNE's superior abilities; that, for the same reason, he has endeavoured, by every means in his power, to thwart General CLINTON, to the great disadvantage of his Majesty's service; that he is dissipated, and more attentive to his pleasures than to the business of the nation; that he is not really equal in capacity

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to so important a command ; and that there can be no hopes of the Rebellion's being speedily extinguished, if He continue at the head of the Army.

However wrong some of these assertions may be, (if indeed they are *at all* wrong,) the following facts are unquestionable and undeniable; viz. That General HOWE might, with the utmost ease, have destroyed WASHINGTON'S Army, and thereby have put a total end to the Rebellion, at many different times, and most favourable opportunities, in the Autumn of 1776: — That he might most effectually have succoured General BURGOYNE, without the least injury to any service he could propose to execute; and that he has most unaccountably and unexpectedly trifled away all the last year; having really done Nothing, at the head of the finest and most executive Army under Heaven, but take, or rather take *possession* of, *Philadelphia*; which, it is notorious, he might have done in *April* last, or indeed whenever he pleased, by marching with a few battalions from *Brunswick*, without giving himself or his troops the trouble, vexation, and disgrace, of *retreating* from thence to *Staten-Island*; there embarking, and remaining, so embarked, for *three weeks*, when the weather was hot in the extreme; and, after all, spending *other* three weeks, or a *month*, in sailing round to *Chesapeake-Bay*, and from thence marching to *Philadelphia*; exactly the same distance of road, as it was immediately from *Brunswick* to that city.

I have said that General HOWE has done *nothing* but take possession of *Philadelphia*: I only mean by this, that he has not, *as far as we know*, done any thing *decisive*. When the Army left the *Ferseys*, it was pretended, that the General, unwilling to risk the loss of two or three thousand brave men, had determined not to attack WASHINGTON in his almost inaccessible *camp*, but had fallen on another mode of doing the business almost as effectually, without so much hazard.—The Army, and every body else, understood by this, that Mr HOWE intended to get round WASHINGTON; cut off his retreat Westward or Southward; attack him from behind the mountains, where it was said to be more practicable; or, if he should abandon those strong-holds, then to pursue him with unabating vigour, till his whole army should be either destroyed or dispersed. But we cannot learn that this has been the case; or that any thing more has been done than defeating Detachments, that had been sent out by WASHINGTON to annoy the King's troops; notwithstanding it is currently reported by the Military, that the Rebels might easily have been come at and annihilated, in spite of the Numbers which they boast of.—“ But was it not absolutely necessary to open a communication by the *Delaware*? And might not the reduction of *Mud-Island* and *Red-Bank* Forts unavoidably detain the Army?”—The opening the *Delaware* was undoubtedly necessary; but as that business chiefly belonged to the Shipping, it needed not

to have impeded the operations of the whole Army.—These facts therefore, thus stated, being plain, intelligible, and I believe incontestable either here or on your side of the water, surely stand in need of no comment. The most candid angel, I think, cannot draw inferences from them much in the General's favour.

You are right: it always was, and still is, my opinion, “That, had the operations of the Army been confined *at first* to the *New England Colonies*, and *they* reduced to obedience, the rest could not have long sustained the contest.”

—Things and circumstances are, however, *now* altered. The grand object is WASHINGTON's *Army*: destroy that, and you may be assured that *none* of the Colonies will any longer resist you. Indeed I am well persuaded, that the *New Englanders* will be the first to submit; and that they will not hesitate one moment to provide for their own safety, as soon as ever real danger approaches their doors. Take but away their *Congress-men* and *Committee-men*, with the *whole body of their Preachers of sedition*; and I doubt much whether they would not submit immediately. The bulk of the people have suffered, and are still suffering, pretty severely; and I am *well* informed, that they boast but *very little indeed* of the success against BURGOYNE. They have paid very dear for that matter; there being scarce a family but has lost a husband, a father, or a brother; and some that have lost all the three.


You will, no doubt, plainly perceive, by the present

present appearance of things, that the most serious and spirited exertions of Government are absolutely necessary for the next year, if it is meant to be a decisive one, and to put an end to the Rebellion. I need not tell you how religiously we all wish for this; and how anxious we are to hear what effect those delays, and BURGOYNE's affair, have upon you at home; and what resolutions you will take in consequence. We *here* see the necessity of large reinforcements, to compose *two* Armies, to act with great spirit and vigour as early as possible in the spring: one to the Southward, and another very *executive* body to the Eastward: an Army that will make itself *severely* felt; vigorous and active in *following* their blows, and careful to *finish* their work.

You will, I dare say, by this time, be ready to join in the universal opinion *here*, that a Change of both men and measures in this country is become absolutely necessary. The *numbers* you will send us will be of little use, without Men of Sense and Activity to command them. Your Soldiers are perfectly admirable in the field, for fine discipline, intrepid bravery, and surprising activity. But what avail all these advantages, if they are not led on to combat?—Whatever General HOWE's motives may be, for conducting matters in the easy, dilatory way he has hitherto done, the effect has been ruinous to the Country; whilst both the Rebels and Rebellion have been so evidently, so provokingly encouraged, as to force many rash expressions

pressions from the mouths of men, whose firmness, zeal, and sufferings, do real honour to the nation, as well as to themselves. These men say, they have abundant reason to think it would have been very greatly to their advantage to have been Rebels; because they see, that such *only* are considered as of any kind of consequence,—as worthy of the least attention or notice at Head-quarters. They therefore say,—what I should blush to mention, were it not strictly true,—“That in case of a future Rebellion, they believe that Government would hardly have an Adherent in all the Colonies.” In this I am persuaded, however, they go too far; for there are not a few, I trust, whose *principles* would never allow them to revolt from their lawful Sovereign; though, indeed, there is no knowing to what extremities the best of men may be reduced by continued persecution: yet I hope I may still answer for myself, and for all my family who have arrived at man’s estate, and are capable of discriminating between vice and virtue. Accept—as they are in duty bound to request you would—of their most grateful respects; and believe me, dear Sir,

Yours, &c. &c. &c.



NEW-YORK, Jan. 27. 1778.

BEFORE this can reach you, all the particulars of the last campaign must have come to your knowledge. It has been a sad campaign

paign indeed, and very far from answering the expectations I had last Spring. The Winter has shut up all communication with *Philadelphia*, so that we know not what passes there; but I expect nothing of any consequence from that quarter.—WASHINGTON is posted with about *seven thousand* men, about *twenty-five* miles from *Philadelphia*. It is said that Reinforcements are going to him from North and South; but I think he will not have the hardiness to attack General HOWE; and the latter, it is probable, will remain in his winter-quarters. Here, and at *Rhode-Island*, every thing is quiet: the Rebels do not attack us; and we are too weak to act offensively.

Our eyes are once more turned towards *England*, in anxious expectation of the measures that may be next adopted. There never was a braver or more gallant Army, better appointed, or more eager for action, than the *British* Army in *America*. Yet, the want of vigour in its operations, and the not making any advantage of the repeated defeats given to the Rebels, have not only prevented the Rebellion *hitherto* from being *suppressed*, but have given it strength and confidence. *Government* has done much—all indeed that could be expected: but *now* it must do more, by sending over more men. This, however, will avail little, if not accompanied with Spirit and Decision.—But I shall not enter on this subject. I leave it to others, whose more immediate business it is. I could say much; but it could afford

ford neither of us any pleasure. I shall only observe, that, had there been a *design* formed for protracting this war, and throwing disgrace on the measures of Government, as opposed by your *gracious Minority*, no steps more effectual for the purpose could have been taken *here*. I am far from supposing, that there *was* any such design; but I must tell you, that *others* throw out such hints and innuendos. The Rebels themselves seem to entertain this opinion.—May the present Ministry remain firm and unshaken! May our future measures *here* be marked with vigour and wisdom! And then, with the blessing of Heaven on a rightful cause, I doubt not but *Britain* will triumph, and the monster *Rebellion* be bound in chains!

Your affectionate Servant, &c. &c.



NEW-YORK, Feb. 7. 1778.

I AM almost tired of politics; and was not my own fate so interwoven with this country's, I should be completely so. But speak I must, though, like CASSANDRA, I am not heeded, till too late. I observe you think my intelligence sometimes of consequence enough to be communicated to the Great. I wish for the honour of *Britain*, and the happiness of this distracted Continent, that I could open the eyes of those great ones to both; for they are surely much misinformed, by the measures hitherto

thereto pursued, or *approved* of. It is truly become a doubt amongst the friends of constitutional subordination in these parts, what the governing powers aim at with respect to *America*. Their words and their actions are discordant. They call the *Americans*, Rebels; yet in every instance they are treated like the Subjects of an Independent State: nay, in many instances they prescribe to Us; and we have not dared to provoke their resentment by refusal. Can *Englishmen* still flatter themselves with a *reconciliation*? Do they still imagine that any *redress* of *grievances* will bring this people to a sense of duty? Alas! they have but one grievance to redress; that is, *their subordination to Great Britain*; in which all others are included. Of this I have long been convinced, even before the accursed Repeal of the *Stamp Act*: and I should imagine, that three inglorious, trifling campaigns ought to have convinced the Nation of the same truth.

The Leaders of this Rebellion are a set of men principled against *Monarchy* in its mildest form. Their conversations, their public actions, their preachments, and their collegiate education, have all tended to this one favourite object, DEMOCRACY: and of this you have been yourself an eye and ear witness. In short, both you and I know, that the Independents of this country have sown the seeds of this Rebellion, nursed them, and are now reaping the fruits of their industry, which has been truly unremitting as well as successful: their

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very spirit is levelling, and consequently anti-monarchical.

Had I access to the ear of Administration, I would tell them, in the integrity of my heart, and at the risk of their displeasure, That the honour of *Britain*, and the happiness of *America*, nay, that the interests of *Humanity*, admit but of one alternative in this dispute; viz. an unconditional Submission, or a total Independence, on the side of *America*; and on the side of *Britain*, a vigorous and rigorous Exertion of her powers, or a total Abdication of the country. The latter, I hope, you will never admit of; though indeed you are likely to be reduced to it, by present appearances, and present management.

If the King's Speech is the voice of the virtuous and larger part of the Nation; and a constitutional Subordination is the aim; I can assure him, that he has mistaken his instruments for bringing that event about: that this disorder required military Ardour, instead of reams of Proclamations, and trafficking for Peace: that the Inactivity of three Campaigns has nursed this Rebellion from Infancy to Manhood: that gaining victories without advantages, and taking towns without strengthening our cause, are things, however paradoxical, reserved for the military talents of our Generals to exhibit: that the Rebels now, instead of running from Red-coats, as at first, have faced them in the open field; have attacked them with the bayonet, as on the *Mohawk-River*; and have even attempted

ted their lines;—with what success, BENNINGTON and BURGOYNE's last misfortune too fully testify. In short, I would tell him, That there has been an uninterrupted series of blunders committed in the course of these two last campaigns, from the first six hours after landing on *Long-Island*, to this very moment. If Government seriously mean to subdue *America*, these men will never do it, to the day of judgment. I need not explain myself, by listing abilities, or political prejudices. There is not a man either of the Fleet or Army, with whom I have conversed,—and you know my acquaintance with them is pretty general,—but will in confidence acknowledge all that I have said. Other Measures must be adopted, and other Men employed. *Britain* has been too long pusillanimous. She ought to have seen, that C——N and the Brothers have been fighting the cause of the Opposition at home, instead of asserting the King's cause abroad; whether wittingly or ignorantly, will be judged of according to different mens opinions. She ought to have called to *Justice* some of her clamorous republican Orators, and then all matters would have soon been accommodated. Is *Britain* so destitute of Generals, that she cannot afford a change? And is Administration so destitute of Friends, that they must necessarily employ their Enemies? Last war, PITT changed and changed again, till he found men for his purpose; and at last he and the nation were well served. But the King's present Servants,

with ten times more Integrity, do not seem to possess half the Resolution,—though indeed much allowance must be made for the violence of opposition,—or otherwise they would have made the experiment. In the course of two campaigns, I may say three, the d—l's in it if a General has not an opportunity of shewing Abilities, provided he possesses any such commodity. Our Soldiers, it is true, gain victories, wherever they can come at their foes: but what are the consequences? there I leave our Generals to reply. Our men march over the Country where they please, bearing down all opposition; and at the end of a fatiguing campaign, have the pleasing prospect before them, of doing the same thing over again the next Summer. And this, for any thing I can see, is likely to be the case, so long as *England* will find Men and Money to sport away in such an inconsequential waste of both. They tell us, we are to have twenty thousand men more sent out to us: let them come: they bespeak the wealth, at least, of the country: and if they do not frighten the wives and children of the Rebels, they may probably, by good management, be as harmless as any we have yet had. If you send us two hundred thousand men, we shall not be a jot the nearer Conquest, under our present Commanders. The men now here, if they had been properly employed, would have crushed this Rebellion long ago. Therefore, if the same Heads are to guide, it matters not whether the Hands to be employed are few or many.

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The Admiral was some months ago applied to, for Letters of Marque, and Commissions for Privateers, to ferret out a numerous nest of small craft, which go between the *Carolinas* and the *French West-India Islands*, and supply the whole Rebel Continent. With great heat and emotion he exclaimed,—“ Good God! will you never have done teasing me? will you leave no room for a Reconciliation?”—Such are the Principles he acts upon; the Consequences speak aloud to every man, for themselves. The Rebels confiscate and sell the Effects of Friends to Government, at their pleasure; and, in many instances, have hanged as spies, or recruiting-officers, such as have been particularly active against them. Rebel property again, in *our* possession, has been generally preserved; and the Owners, on taking the oath of allegiance, which they made no scruple of doing to serve their own purposes, have been put in possession of their Houses and Estates, as if they had been always Loyal. Thus are we jumbled together in this Town, with a set of as great Villains as were ever unchanged: and we have the flattering prospect before us, of being the only or the greatest Sufferers, however matters turn out.

In a former Letter I furnished you with some Instances of most unaccountable neglect in our Commander in Chief. I even urged you to publish them; that both Ministry and People might be made sensible how they were abused; and how the Honour of the Empire was prostituted to a misplaced Lenity. If you are a
Friend

Friend to *America*; if you ever hope to revisit these once hospitable Regions; I beseech you to use your utmost endeavours to open the eyes of Government and the Kingdom, to the shameful manner in which the War here has been conducted, and to the Distresses of the Friends both of King and Constitution. Lenity to the Delinquents is Cruelty in its consequences, not only to your Adherents in this country, but to *Britain* itself. Think how many brave men have fallen, and how many millions have been expended, to no purpose, already. For God's sake, let there be as few more thus thrown away as possible. Let other Measures be adopted, and let other Men conduct them. If with you there is any want of good Generals, we have good men enough here on the spot; who would improve by former blunders, if they were otherwise destitute of experience. Many Commanders of Corps are fitter than most of our Generals for managing this kind of war; and none, I verily believe, more unfit than most of our first-rate ones. The only masterly coup that has been struck this campaign, saving the wonderful exertions of Colonel MUSGRAVE at *German-Town*, which indeed preserved the whole *British* Army from disgrace, was by General GRAY, after the so much vaunted victory of *Brandiwine*. A few such actions might restore us to our former reputation with the Rebels, who now certainly hold us very cheap.

I cannot conclude this long letter without
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mentioning, that the loyal and spirited Mr RICHARDS, of *Second-River* in *Jersey*, was lately murdered by a Militia Rebel. The perpetrator of the horrid act was caught; but we dare not punish him. Why?—"he was in the way of his *duty*." We shall All soon, I believe, be Rebels: and indeed it is much the safest side of the question. Not one Example has been yet made of two hundred, confined for burning this City. And I have reason to presume that most of them are now released. Some people were lately caught in the act of going off from hence to the Rebels, in a canoe! It is true they are in confinement; but never likely to be punished, though the Rebels have repeatedly *hanged* in like cases. In short, they *dare* us every way; and we are obliged, though indignantly, to *submit*. Use this as you please.

With compliments to the family, I remain
Your's affectionately always, &c. &c.

☞ The original LETTERS from whence the following Articles were collected, not being, at *present*, obtainable; the Substance of them is taken from a Letter to a Person *then* in the *country*, written by the Gentleman who received them, in the month of *May*.

ALL our friends in *America*, from whom we have any opportunity of hearing, were in high expectation of large reinforcements to the royal Army; and such a measure was undoubtedly due to such a cause. However, the want of Troops is of less consequence than the want of a proper General, and of right Measures in the management of the Army already there; and
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this latter want is, I trust, before this time, in a good degree supplied: for *you may rely upon it*, that General CLINTON was to take upon him the command, as soon as the *aid-de-camps* arrived, who sailed from hence in March;—and it is the opinion of people on both sides of the Atlantic, that *he* will exert himself properly.

You seem to look upon every thing as completely lost: Heaven be thanked, I do not! I believe the Rebels to be in a most pitiful condition; their Country nearly exhausted; the Inhabitants greatly discontented and divided; and our Army there still sufficient for every military purpose; or that it may be made so by encouraging the *Americans* to enlist. My belief is founded on the information received from *New-York* and *Philadelphia* by the last ships.

The *Congress*, in order to keep up the appearance of an Army, have been obliged to detain for the whole war, all those who had enlisted into their service for the period only of a few months: others that are wanted, they impress; as there are none left in the country who are *willing to enter*. *Draughts* were also to be made from the Militia; which, it was fully expected, would occasion no small tumult and confusion.

But this is not the only nor the greatest difficulty they have to contend with. Their *paper-money* hangs like a mill-stone about their neck, and is ready to sink them. It appears, from unquestionable documents, which have been luckily obtained, that, on the 31st of *December*

cember last, they had emitted 115 millions of dollars; that they had borrowed twenty millions more, for which they were to pay 6 *per cent.* interest; and that they had incurred other debts,—for the discharge of which, five millions were to be levied by taxes on the inhabitants in 1778; to say nothing of upwards of four millions more, which had been emitted by the several *States*, on their own separate accounts.

It has been shown, on a fair computation, that this debt, as it *then* stood, amounts to several millions Sterling more than all the Property, together with the fee-simple of the Soil, in the Thirteen Confederated Colonies, is worth; and that, if the Rebellion should continue, the debt must increase at the rate of about *a million Sterling per month*. I think there is no room to doubt the truth of these facts; which, in conjunction with many other circumstances of unparalleled distress, will justify the belief, that the game is nearly over with the *Congress*, *provided* our new General, and new Commissioners, will do their business properly.



NEW-YORK, April 29. 1778.

THINGS are now in a queer situation indeed. Commissioners are daily expected here; and it may be presumed that we shall not act offensively, nor give any interruption to the Rebels, before the effects of your Lenity to them are fully known. Some considerable time must elapse

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before

before that happens. As matters are now circumstanced, all negotiation must be with the *Congress*, or with bodies subordinate to them; for all opposition to them has long since lain prostrate. If a settlement should therefore take place, the *Congress* will bear away all the honour of it: a circumstance very mortifying to the Loyalists.

By Governor TRYON's activity, the Acts of Parliament have been sent to all the Northern Colonies—even to the *Congress* and Mr WASHINGTON. It is impossible yet to determine what will be the result. In general, the Acts have been treated by the Rebels with the utmost contempt; were attributed to fear, and inability to carry on the war; whilst Some have declared that they were satisfactory, and that the dispute should, on this ground, be accommodated. But all this affords not a sufficient foundation to form any certain judgment of the issue.

The Colonists, beyond all doubt, are much distressed for necessaries: their currency has almost lost its credit; and they are obliged to *draft* men in order to recruit their army. These circumstances, joined to a presumption that some sparks of affection to the parent-state are still alive, would induce one to conclude that they would be desirous of terminating the war on such advantageous terms, and so much seemingly to their reputation: But, on the other hand, those republican, independent Principles, which were the chief source and spring of
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the Rebellion, still continue in full vigour.— The Rebels are greatly flushed with their success against BURGOYNE: the *Congress*, the Army, the several legislatures and posts of trust and profit in the different *States*, are mostly filled with *violent* men, of little property, and who therefore can hardly be supposed willing to relinquish their present state, and fall back into their original obscurity; not to mention a consciousness that they have offended past all hope of a cordial forgiveness on the side of Government. These are circumstances which do not promise any success to Negotiation, and which incline many judicious persons here to think, that those offers on the part of *Great Britain* will come to nothing. In this state of uncertainty are we at present. It is whispered here, that some of the officers who went home last winter, intimate friends of the late Commander in Chief, made such a terrible representation of the Powers and Resources of the Colonies, as frightened all *England*. But really, if this was the case, you were wretchedly imposed on. It may be convenient to magnify the State of the Rebels, in order to palliate the shameful conduct on our part. WASHINGTON has slumbered and slept in quiet, at the distance of 20 miles from *Philadelphia*, this whole winter, with no more than about 5000 men: Sir W. HOWE had upwards of 16,000, as brave fellows, and as eager to engage, as ever took the field; yet he gave the former no interruption. The case was similar the preceding

ding winter: with such management the Rebels might maintain the war against a *British* Army of 100,000 men, nay, of a million; yet I would pawn my head upon it, that 10,000 *British* Troops, even of those now here, under a proper Leader,—under Sir H. CLINTON,—would march from one end of this Continent to the other, in spite of every effort the Rebels could make to stop their progress. I am not singular in this opinion; it is the *general* opinion. But it is needless to talk of these matters now:—Providence, I hope, will take care of us;—there lies my chief dependence. Sir HENRY CLINTON's appointment to the Chief Command gives universal joy to all the *American Loyalists*; and, so far as I can learn, to the Army. He is an excellent Officer, and I believe well-disposed to vindicate the injured Honour and Interest of his Country.

Adieu!



NEW-YORK, May 3. 1778.

— One part of parliamentary expectation is already disappointed by a vote of *Congress*: for BOUDENOT, the rebel commissary of prisoners, who arrived here last night with Colonel CAMPBELL, in exchange for ETHAN ALLEN—who had years ago been outlawed by the Assembly of this very Province, for exciting tumults against the Constitutional authority,—brought notice of the Vote immediately


diately passed by the *Congress*, on receiving the draft of the Bills, transmitted to them under a flag of truce by Governor TRYON; by which it is made an *indispensable preliminary* to Negotiation, “ That *Great Britain* shall withdraw entirely her Fleets and Armies, and acknowledge the *Independence* of the *United Colonies*.” By this they naturally prevent the operation of those bills among the oppressed subjects of their tyranny, who dare not publicly express any sentiments disapproved by their *Sovereign Lords*.

WASHINGTON wrote a genteel enough letter, considering his situation, to General TRYON, by whom the Bills were transmitted: in which he says, “ That he has no objection to the *circulation* of the proposals, as he is under no apprehension of their *effects*; from an entire confidence in the attachment of his troops; and that he shall publish them in as ample a manner as his Excellency could wish.” Accordingly, they have appeared in the Rebel Papers, with the Governor’s Certificate, and an Answer in *character*—supposed by LIVINGSTON of the *Jerseys*. Colonel CAMPBELL dined with his titular Excellency a few days ago near *Elizabeth-Town*; when, beside his natural reserve, and unpleasing countenance, he appeared much dejected;—and keeps himself always surrounded, both at home and abroad, by a party of horse.

WASHINGTON has at present about *eight thousand* troops; and except Sir H. CLINTON, who is gone to take the command, is at liberty
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to give him a drubbing, they will probably amount to near double that number, by the month of *June*. From the most authentic accounts, the Persons of Property are entirely disposed to adopt the Conciliatory Plan, from a dear-bought experience of the ruinous and tyrannical system which has so long prevailed amongst them; although the above-mentioned *vote* may prevent any *public* expression of their sentiments. But I have no doubt that a vigorous exertion of the Force here at present, with the Reinforcements which the spirit of the Nation lately promised, may still easily compell them to accept of just and reasonable terms, without any sacrifice of the Imperial Rights of the Mother-Country. I beg my respects to Mrs —; and am, dear Sir,

Your's, &c. &c.



NEW-YORK, Sept. 15. 1778.

I KNOW not what to say to you of the state of affairs in this country, which have hitherto been so wretchedly managed, that I can scarce bear to think of them. But we have the greatest confidence in our present Commander in chief; and as it is said the Army is going into immediate action, I hope something decisive may yet be done before Winter.—The Rebellion appears to me to be in a very tottering condition; and if we do not add vigour to it by our own misconduct, it cannot subsist much longer.


longer. The People are far from being satisfied with their new Government; which is indeed a very oppressive one. But the mischief is, the terms proposed by the commissioners are such as will leave this country independent on *Great Britain* in almost every thing but Name: and I am confident, had less been offered, it would have been more attended to.

BUTLER is doing much good upon the frontiers; and much more might be expected from him, did the army from hence act in concert with him: but we scorn to take *advantages*. When BURGOYNE was coming from the North, Sir WILLIAM HOWE moved to the South. When BUTLER was coming into the frontiers of *Pennsylvania*, our Army was obliged to abandon *Philadelphia*: and when the Rebellion shall be just expiring, we still fear that some cross accident or other will give it new life and vigour.—Lord HOWE is a good deal blamed for not attacking the *French* Fleet in the harbour of *New-Port*; which many Officers of the Navy think was very practicable, and would have been successful.—He is also blamed for wasting so much time afterward at *Sandy-Hook*, while the *French* Fleet lay off *Delaware*, with two of their capital ships disabled, when they might have been attacked to great advantage. But they have now gone into *Boston*, where they ride in all safety. Nothing decisive seems yet to have been aimed at: and if Measures should not be altered, this Country must be lost; not
from

from any great Strength or Art of the Rebels, but merely from our own Misconduct.

With due compliments to the family, &c. &c.

I remain Your's very affectionately.




NEW-YORK, Oct. 2. 1778.

I AM sometimes doubtful of your ever returning to this unhappy country. It is indeed unworthy of you; but I am in hopes it will grow better. Pretty thoroughly *chastised*, I am persuaded, we *shall* be: and if wholesome correction produces its usual effect, there may be some reasonable hopes entertained of *us*.

I have already written my political sentiments to Lord —: to him I must therefore refer you; for the busy scene in which I am engaged, will not suffer me to multiply letters. I cannot however help observing, That matters here are by no means so desperate as your *English* imaginations seem to paint them; and I will venture decidedly to pronounce, that this Country is *already* subdued, as far as her *internal* strength and resources are concerned. As to her present Connection with *France*, (since the well-concerted plan of D'ESTAING's fleet has been I think *entirely* frustrated), it will only encrease her difficulties, and reduce the little strength remaining to total debility.—It is impossible for WASHINGTON to *recruit* his Army; hardly will he be able to preserve it in its *present* force. The *Congress-money* is reduced to
very

very little value; and the minds and hearts of the People revolt against their unnatural Popish Alliance. Have courage then, my good friend, and keep up your spirits till you hear again from me, when I hope to send you yet better tidings.

Your's, as ever, &c. &c.



NEW-YORK, Dec. 23. 1778.

MY hopes of seeing you again in this place return:—they have been languid enough, for some time past, I confess: but are somewhat revived by the intelligence we have now received by the *October* Packet;—that of *September* had been taken by the Rebels. The heavy losses sustained by the *French* in their trade; the failure of remittances from their Rebel Allies here; the pitiful figure made by D'ESTAING on this coast, who in fact did nothing but expose the Perfidy of his Nation; these, I say, joined to the superiority of the *English* Fleet over that of the *French*, will most probably make the latter sick of the War, and of their new Alliance, and consequently prevent an *open* rupture with *France*. After the insolent treatment of the King's Commissioners by the *Congress*, and the latter's refusal of the generous terms offered by Government, I flatter myself that the real views of the Rebels can no longer be concealed, or palliated; and that none will have the effrontery to support or abet them.

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
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The Nation, I trust, will recover from its languor and tameness, and unite in exerting the strength and resources she still possesses, to chastise her Enemies, and rescue Herself from Infamy and Ruin.

Be fully assured, that nothing but a moderate share of exertion and prudence, on the part of *Great Britain*, is necessary to crush the Rebellion. Its Leaders are divided; its Vigour nearly spent; its Resources exhausted. The Loyalists, who are undoubtedly a majority of its inhabitants at this day, groan under the iron hand of Tyranny and Oppression; and are anxious for an opportunity to assist in rescuing themselves from such a state of wretchedness and Slavery.

JOHN JAY is now President of the *Congress*. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS was competitor with him for that *exalted Office*, but was *distanced*. WASHINGTON's Head-quarters are fixed, for the Winter, near *Bound-Brook*, about eight miles above *Brunswick*. He has about 2700 Men with him there, and in other parts of *Jersey*. What the number of the whole Rebel Army of Continental troops amount to *now*, is very uncertain. Last Autumn it consisted of not more than 16,000 Men: but the time for which some of these were enlisted expired the first instant, and that of many more will expire the first of next month; and Desertion prevails very much among them. The Rebels believed that the Continent would be abandoned by the *British* troops this Winter, and the Contest given up; and by this notion, which they industriously

industriously propagated, hoped to recruit their Army. That opinion now begins to wear off; and hence, I think, they will meet with insuperable difficulties when they attempt to muster another Army.



☞ The following LETTER, which shall conclude the *present* Publication, is precisely in the same Circumstance with a preceding one, at page 71.

LONDON, *March* 20. 1779.

MY last letters from *New-York*, received in the course of the present month, declare the Loyalists to be in the highest spirits, and the Rebels under the greatest dejection, on viewing the posture of *American* affairs. The rapid successes of Colonel CAMPBELL to the Southward, with an apprehension that he would improve his victories, deeply impressed the minds of the Rebels, and added greatly to their Distress.

Even before this, they were much discouraged and divided, as well as exhausted; not knowing how to obtain the supplies of Men and Provisions that were wanted, in order to keep up an Army. Their *money* was so depreciated, that it would produce neither. A Letter from SILAS DEAN to Dr FRANKLIN had been lately intercepted; in which he told him, " That unless *France* would speedily send over *several millions in Specie*, it would be impossible

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to prevent their *paper bills* from sinking to *nothing*; and that their *cause* must absolutely sink with them." Other letters were also intercepted, which spoke the same language. I doubt not but they spoke the truth, as great l—rs as the Rebels are, and always have been, on other occasions.

Now, considering that the *Congress* has *attempted* to make but very small remittances to *France*, in proportion to the Demands of the latter; and that the remittances attempted have been mostly *intercepted* by our Cruisers, so that all the mercantile houses in *France*, concerned in the *American* trade, have actually failed, and all the bills drawn upon them by the *Congress* have been *protested*, and that *France* has not money or Credit enough to provide for its own immediate necessities; I leave you to judge, whether it is likely, or even possible, that the *several millions* wanted *will* be remitted, or the Congress-money be kept from Destruction, and the Rebellion from Annihilation.

Very many of the Rebel Officers had already quitted the service; and it was the general opinion, founded on unambiguous facts, that the Rebels could bring no Army into the field this Summer, but such as will consist of *Militia* and *drafted* men; and not *many* even of these. Their chief hopes had been founded on the expectation that our troops, &c. would be *starved* in *New-York*; or that the City would be evacuated, as they were told was the intention:
but

but the arrival of the two *Corke* Fleets, together with other appearances, had at length convinced them, that consolation could no longer be derived from either of these presumptions.

In the mean while, they were groaning under intolerable Tyranny, and such a load of *Taxes* as no human strength can support. *Fifteen millions of dollars* were to be levied upon them in the *present* Year; and the same sum was to be raised in the same way, for *eighteen years to come*, *beside* the Debt *already* contracted, and which is increasing at an amazing rate.—This is *liberty and property* with a vengeance! Such are the blessed fruits of Rebellion! Thus the D—l rewards his servants always, notwithstanding his fair Promises; paying them constantly at last in *their own Coin*——in Bills of *Congressional Paper*.

FAREWELL.

F I N I S.

The first of the two parts of the
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